South Korean President Takes Over A Country Deeply Split By Gender Politics

Liberal candidate Lee Jae-myung has won South Korea's snap presidential election with a clear lead. With all of the ballots counted, Lee won almost 50% of the vote, ahead of his conservative rival Kim Moon-soo on 41%. He takes over a country that is deeply divided along gender lines.

Lee's campaign effectively channelled voter anger. He focused on resetting South Korea's politics after impeached former president Yoon Suk Yeol, who was from the same party as Kim, unleashed chaos by declaring martial law in December 2024.

However, gender conflict has continued, subtly but powerfully, to shape voter behaviour, campaign strategies and the national debate about who is to blame for the lack of opportunities in South Korea for young men.

The election took place three years after Yoon pipped Lee to the presidency by just a quarter of a million votes – the closest margin in the country's history. Yoon's victory was, as has been noted by researcher Kyungja Jung, “the epitome of the utilisation of gender wars”.

A key part of Yoon's strategy was fostering a sense among young Korean men that it was now them, rather than women, who were the victims of discrimination. He secured 59% of the vote from men in their 20s and 53% from men in their 30s. Just 34% of women in their 20s supported him.

In the latest election, gender was everywhere and nowhere all at once. On the one hand, not a single candidate put forward a meaningful policy to address structural gender discrimination in the workplace, domestic violence or public sexual harassment.

None even mentioned the gaping absence of women candidates, despite thousands of mostly young women having filled the streets demanding democracy after Yoon's martial law declaration. It was the first time in nearly 20 years that not a single woman stood among the contenders for the highest role in the country.

Lee, positioning himself as the consensus candidate, attempted to neutralise gender as a campaign issue. When reporters asked him whether he would announce any women-related pledges, he said: “Why do you keep dividing men and women? They are all Koreans.”

His remark may sound inclusive. But it signals a strategy to declare the gender issue off-limits for the sake of the greater good, thus sidestepping the specific inequalities that continue to divide the country. It's a form of unity by erasure.

Lee Jun-seok of the right-wing Reform party, on the other hand, tried to resurrect the same playbook that delivered Yoon to power in 2022. He attempted to provoke, polarise and win the loyalty of disaffected young men.

As Yoon had done three years ago, he called for the abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. And during a televised debate, he asked: “If someone says they want to stick chopsticks into women's genitals, would that count as misogyny?” The question was a nod to a controversial online remark Lee Jae-myung's son had made years earlier.

Lee Jun-seok's comment drew widespread condemnation and, ultimately, he only scraped about 7.7% of the total vote. This included over 37% of men in their 20s, while 58% of women in the same age group backed Lee Jae-myung. Gender is a highly political matter in South Korea whichever way you look at it.

Gender wars

This gender divide is now one of the most consistent features of South Korean politics. Women are vocal and visible in public to safeguard not just their own rights, but also South Korea's democracy.

Yet populist politicians have cultivated a perception among young men – squeezed by stagnant wages, fierce competition over jobs and social expectations – that their diminishing opportunities are due to policies they see as favouring women.

This has resulted in many young South Korean men seeing feminism not as a movement for equality but as an obstacle to their own progress. In reality, their struggle has less to do with gender and more to do with structural inequalities in income and opportunity for all young Koreans.

As Kyungja Jung observed in a paper from 2024: “Misogyny becomes an outlet for their [South Korean men's] frustration and masculinity crisis as they search for a scapegoat for their struggles in neoliberal society. They blame women rather than the neoliberal economy.”

Young people even from the best universities in Korea feel they cannot compete in the job market no matter what they do. South Korea now has one of the highest rates of young people not in education, employment or training among the OECD countries. This has given rise to the so-called “N-Po” generation, who feel so disadvantaged that they have given up on all future dreams of marriage, family and a career.

South Korea isn't alone in mobilising backlash against feminism and gender equality. Around the globe, gender has become one of the major fault lines in politics. In the November 2024 US election, Donald Trump led among young men by 14 points, while Kamala Harris had an 18-point edge with young women.

Meanwhile, self-described misogynist Andrew Tate continues to shape young male attitudes online. And in Italy, Giorgia Meloni rose to power on a far-right platform that, despite being a woman herself, reduces women to their roles as mothers and homemakers.

One model for change in South Korea could be to introduce quotas for women in politics to make their voices heard. Women only occupy around 20% of the 300 seats in South Korea's National Assembly, trailing well behind the global (27.2%) and Asian (22.1%) averages. If women are not in politics making decisions about themselves, then their voices will not be heard beyond the streets.

Lee Jae-myung's win has given South Korea a moment to breathe. But the fault lines remain. When an entire demographic, be it young men or women, feels systematically unheard or structurally discriminated against, opportunistic voices can move in to fill the void.

Gender is political. Ignoring it may be just as risky as confronting it head-on.

(Authors: Ming Gao, Research Scholar of East Asia Studies, Lund University and Joanna Elfving-Hwang, Associate Professor (Korean Society and Culture), Director of Korea Research & Engagement Centre, Curtin University)

(Disclosure Statement: Ming Gao receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. This research was produced with support from the Swedish Research Council grant "Moved Apart" (nr. 2022-01864). Ming Gao is a member of Lund University Profile Area: Human Rights. Joanna Elfving-Hwang receives funding from the Academy of Korean Studies. This research was supported by the Core University Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2022-OLU-2250005)

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