A new case of alleged smuggling of biological materials into the US has occurred, with a Chinese student arrested on June 8 for posting four packages over a six month period to the University of Michigan. These contained biological materials for cultivating roundworm.
Only days before that, two other Chinese nationals were charged for attempting to smuggle a crop-damaging fungus, Fusarium graminearum, into the same lab at the University of Michigan. Two separate cases involving Chinese nationals and the same US university is a red flag that American authorities would no doubt be investigating. More broadly, it raises concerns about inadequate oversight of international biological research collaborations. Roundworm is not a biological weapon, but the fungus smuggled in the earlier incident could be used to damage crops, which would be agricultural bioterrorism.
Biological weapons are the use of bacteria, viruses, bacterial toxins and other biological material to inflict harm on humans, animals or crops. When used by nation states, it is called biowarfare, and when used by non-state actors (such as terrorist groups) it is called bioterrorism. Smuggling of dangerous biological materials is only one geopolitical aspect of biosecurity.
Three years ago, an illegal laboratory was accidentally identified in Reedley, California, containing genetically engineered mice and a range of viruses. This lab was owned by a Chinese biotech company that was supposedly making COVID rapid antigen tests. For this one lab that was detected, how many other clandestine labs may be flying under the radar? And how many illegal importations of biological materials have never been detected?
Bioweapons are called “the poor man's nuke” because they are far more accessible than nuclear weapons. Whilst we do not know if there was nefarious intent around these few identified incidents, they highlight the risk of a Trojan Horse attack in any country, where biological weapons can be smuggled in using the postal service, or can be developed on site using a shopfront with a seemingly harmless purpose.
We need screening, surveillance, early warnings, regulation, oversight and legislation to address this complex threat. Some methods exist for screening postal mail, which are specific for detecting anthrax, or which treat the mail with radiation or heat, but broader screening is needed. Early warning systems that use AI to detect potential biological attacks can improve preparedness. The technology for creating new viruses and genetic engineering of existing viruses to make them more lethal has advanced at a much faster pace than our systems for regulating biological risks. Gene synthesis has dropped in cost by more than 250-fold in a decade and Canadian scientists created an extinct virus, very closely related to smallpox, in a lab in 2017. This means the virus that caused smallpox, could be created in a lab. It could be smuggled into another country or created onsite in a rogue lab. Do it yourself (DIY) biology, too, is expanding rapidly, and self-regulated. The popularity of DIY biology means lab-in-a-box and other equipment are readily available for purchase online. This means terrorists could acquire all the necessary means to produce and then deploy a biological weapon.
There is also the ”insider threat” where highly skilled insiders may collude with terrorist groups or hostile states within regulated laboratories. Currently most countries do not have adequate awareness or processes to detect espionage within universities. Nor do we have adequate legislation to urgently remove a suspected rogue scientist from a lab - the FBI investigation into the main suspect of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US took years, which is too long for prevention of a planned biological attack.
In terms of other laws and regulations, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Cartegena Protocol, local gene regulation laws and the International Health Regulations (IHR), none adequately address the need. The BWC focuses on nation states as actors rather than on terrorists, and is not enforceable or auditable.
The role of legislation, regulation and governance on epidemic control is more important than ever.
(The author is founder, Epiwatch, and head of the biosecurity programme at Kirby Institute)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
