The abrupt end to Operation Sindoor was a bolt from the blue - actually, like an 'out of syllabus' event. It is good that full-scale war was avoided, and one hopes ceasefire violations will die down. Even as the armed forces keep a wary eye on our borders, there are some takeaways that can be deduced as a hot debrief.
Flawless Choreography
First, the present tri-services system worked and the joint operational planning done between that fateful day of terrorist killings in Pahalgam on April 22 and the commencement of attacks on terrorist targets on May 7 delivered results. The intense engagements and the next three days till ceasefire commencement were also expertly choreographed by the Indian Air Force and the army through joint plans. Pakistani drone and missile attacks were relentless, intense and dense, and so were our responses in equal measure.
That almost all Pakistani projectiles (UAVs, missiles, armed and unarmed drones) were engaged successfully is a tribute to the Indian Air Force's (IAF) homegrown Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) that synthesises all military and civilian radars into one composite air situation picture. The threats from targets are prioritised electronically and by fighter controllers, and the most suitable weapon system that can engage them is authorised to take action.
A Largely Aerial Affair
Second, the four days of engagement was majorly, if not wholly, a kinetic affair through the medium of air. The engagements took place in a dense air defence environment where both sides were operating in a contested airspace, unlike the uncontested environment that the western air forces faced in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, or the Israelis in their operations in Gaza and Lebanon. It is but natural that losses would occur, but it is the nature of conflict that the force on the offensive would incur some damage; one is sure that those would be analysed critically by the IAF. From photographic evidence now available, India's UAV and missile strikes were very effective, and the fact that 11 of Pakistan's frontline airbases spread along the length and breadth of the country were addressed is testimony to the IAF's operational reach and the effectiveness of its weapons.
However, innumerable commentaries have been written about the depleting IAF squadron strength, and given that our borders will remain active, the potency of the IAF's bite needs careful monitoring. Weapon systems, encrypted communications and combat enablers like Airborne Warning and Control Systems, aerial flight refuellers and modern cutting-edge weapons need immediate attention. In the final analysis, it must be remembered that this was another example where air power effectiveness enabled the flow of political and diplomatic negotiations towards peace.
Hat-Tip To Indigenous Capabilities
Third, though the S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system hogged media limelight, it was the indigenous radars, SAM and Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems that formed the backbone of our ground-based air defence, highlighting the value of indigenous armament; the fact these were a combination of DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) and private sector products is indeed heartening. The wide availability of drones and anti-drone systems could also be a result of the emergency powers given to the Vice Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief of regional commands.
Institutional ingenuity in the form of an IAF-designed short-range anti-aircraft system, the Surface to Air Missile for Assured Retaliation (SAMAR), came in very handy. SAMAR has refurbished life-expired Russian R73 and R27 air-to-air missiles - which would normally have been junked - used in the surface-to-air missile role. This is a pointer that we have smart minds within our own organisations that need encouragement. Here, an appreciation of the wonderful work done by the tireless Army air defence gunners (who operated legacy equipment like L-70 anti-aircraft guns) and BSF troopers (with their anti-UAV systems) would only be apt.
The Need For An Honest Assessment
Fourth, to a layman who had access only to news from the media, the civil-military-diplomatic machinery appeared to have clicked well. An honest assessment needs to be undertaken, on whether this measured up to the events leading to the ceasefire deal and the assurances obtained before accepting the formulation of the ceasefire. The answer would lie in the response to a single question: would there be a necessity to go for kinetic action every time a terrorist action takes place? The Prime Minister has hinted at this in his address to the nation, and Pakistan must understand that a repeat occurrence down the line would elicit a punitive response.
Did We Achieve What We Aimed For?
Fifth, is the ceasefire indicative of having achieved the aim for which we nearly went to war? A few questions need clarity. Where are the Pahalgam terrorists who started it all with their merciless killings? Has an assurance been given that they would be tracked by Pakistan and handed over? This is vital as they could have crossed the Line of Control in the three weeks that have elapsed since the killings. An equally important aspect is that the Simla agreement mandated only a bilateral settlement of mutual concerns, a position reiterated by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson on May 13. So, why is there an insistence by the US leadership on being the architects of the ceasefire? The statement of US Secretary Marco Rubio, about India having agreed to "...discuss all issues at a neutral venue", along with President Donald Trump reclaiming ownership of the ceasefire and lauding Rubio in public in Saudi Arabia (after the MEA clarification), is intriguing.
A Key Question
And finally, but very importantly, one needs clarity as to whether the Chief of Defence Staff system, which was put to test for the first time, worked as advertised. Who was planning missions and prosecuting the 'war'? Was it the integrated defence staff, or were the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Air Force regional command headquarters synergising action? Even though the expanse of the engagements was limited to the aerial domain, the answer to this question would be an invaluable input for the ongoing revision of our higher defence organisation structure (read theaterisation). A better experience than a wartime crucible would be impossible to find again. That, indeed, would be a fitting tribute to the valiant men and women who spearheaded Op Sindoor.
(The author is a retired Air Vice Marshal of the Indian Air Force)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
