During Operation Sindoor, the Pakistani armed forces displayed their ‘Made in China' export-variant arsenal. This included the use of the HQ-9P and HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles, the PL-15E air-to-air missile, the JL-10CE fighter, and the co-produced JF-17 ‘Thunder' Block III jet. Pakistan is China's biggest client, accounting for 63% of China's total arms export basket between 2020 and 2024. From a Pakistani perspective, China accounts for 81% of its defence imports.
China's arms exports to Pakistan are one part of a complex military production, export, and diplomacy ecosystem that Beijing has built. Over the years, China has focused on becoming self-reliant in the defence manufacturing domain. This process has included making export variants of major weapons. That said, there are challenges that China faces in its defence export agenda. These include political issues and quality-related concerns that make Beijing the lesser-preferred option over the world's top three defence exporters: the US, Russia, and France. Nonetheless, China's defence export market is expanding. And this has significant implications for India.
Growing Military-Industrial Complex
China's military-industrial complex comprises a few, large corporations that focus on innovation and self-reliance. These primarily include the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), and China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO). They are all State-Owned Defence Enterprises, largely under the administrative control of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council. Many of them have been on the Global Fortune 500 lists, and together, they own over 2000 subsidiaries, R&D labs, listed companies and global branch institutions. NORINCO International Ltd., for example, owns oil fields in Iraq and operates R&D and manufacturing facilities in Saudi Arabia.
These entities operate on the concept of ‘Military-Civil Fusion'. This means that their production cycles conform to the operational requirements of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), and most commercial/civilian products can also be deployed for military purposes at the Party-state's request. Hence, these firms concentrate their expertise on a particular industrial cluster of importance to the PLA. The CETC, for example, is the PLA's primary radar, communications infrastructure, and electronics supplier. AVIC, and specifically, its main subsidiary, the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), has its hand in the production of most of China's J-series fighter jets. CSSC, which is the world's largest shipbuilding group, produces most of the PLA Navy's warships. Together, CAIG, CASIC and CASC have also produced most of China's military drones, such as the CH ‘Rainbow' series, the Wing Loong series, and the Wuzhen High-Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) UAV series.
The agenda and priorities for defence production, R&D and safety and quality are laid down by China's chief regulatory body in the military-industrial domain, the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). Naturally, defence production must comply with SASTIND's technological, safety and quality certification standards. In addition, party and government institutions like the Ministry of Industry and IT, Ministry of Commerce, and the Logistics Department of the Central Military Commission, together lay down regulations regarding ideological commitment of defence SOEs, innovation and export control, and management of talent.
China's Export Philosophy
Since 2022, China's defence budget has consistently witnessed a year-on-year rise of 7.2%. A significant chunk of this money goes into producing defence goods. Of course, part of this expansion of defence production is driven by a profit motive, with Chinese weapons finding their way to warring parties. An example is Myanmar, where Chinese arms are available to both the junta government, and the Rakhine-based insurgent group, the ‘Brotherhood Alliance'.
Sometimes, China is also a supplier of last resort for entities seeking low-cost military equipment. One example is Pakistan, which has imported low-cost export variants of the Chengdu J-10C fighter jet. Many of these entities, however, have also included non-state actors such as insurgent groups in Chad and Syria, who were found to be in possession of the Chinese-made FN-6 Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS). Despite the controversies arising from such sales, China veils its exports and uses “non-interference” in internal matters of other countries as justification.
A 'Technological Gap'
It is worth noting that Beijing only prioritises international sales of export variant arms, which are usually of lower quality, and keeps the most advanced and efficient defence systems for itself. Chinese commentators also seem to acknowledge that even though China has a cost advantage with a few arms and ammunition, there exists a “technological gap” and a lack of competitiveness against Western alternatives in major arms, such as fighter jets, aircraft carriers, and large warships. Hence, Beijing believes in maintaining loyal clients, who are developing economies with restricted international options. This can explain why, in addition to Pakistan, China has emerged as the largest arms supplier for West Africa too, accounting for 26% of the region's arms imports in the last five years. It is establishing a footprint in the Middle East as well, but is not a dominant player yet.
Further, China entangles arms sales with defence cooperation and norm entrepreneurship in global security. Xi Jinping's flagship Global Security Initiative (GSI) aims to do just this. Many GSI-friendly countries have become China's top arms importers. With economies in the ASEAN and Indian Ocean Region (IOR), China has penned joint military cooperation agreements, which provide its arms and ammunition exports a boost. For example, in the aftermath of the recent establishment of a China-Indonesia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue on April 21, 2025, Jakarta announced that it is finalising a deal to buy 42 J-10CE fighters from Beijing. Further, with hard basing in Djibouti and likely soft basing in areas like Cambodia's Ream Naval base and Myanmar's Kyaukphyu port, Chinese troops and naval vessels are finding homes abroad and are testing capabilities in the Indian Ocean.
Changing Export Basket
For the longest time, China specialised in the sales of military-grade Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), which include MANPADS, guided anti-tank weapons, mortars and cannons, rifles, and machine guns. Until 2012, most of these weapons went to developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela.
More recently, China's defence export products have featured an extensive arsenal of submarines, aircraft, missiles, and artillery, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic, communications, and light vehicle components. Since 2011-12, China has gained substantial traction in drone exports. In civilian space, China is already the world's largest producer and exporter of drones. Between 2017 and 2024, the UAE, Serbia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, DR Congo, and Pakistan were some of the largest importers of China's armed, surveillance & reconnaissance, and attack UAVs.
In terms of exports of missile technology, China delivered 896 FN-6 portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to Pakistan in 2021, 200 of the QW-11 SAMs to Bangladesh in 2024, and a total of 390+ SAMs and anti-ship/ land attack missiles of various classes to Cambodia. In terms of maritime defence, China's most infamous CSSC shipyards have been the largest suppliers of naval hulls to US allies like Singapore. Since 2010, more than 70% of Bangladesh's defence imports have also come from China. These include two submarines positioned at BNS Pekua, and purchased by Dhaka for a price of $203 million.
It is evident that China is expanding its arms export market share, albeit at a slow rate. India's main concerns, however, remain the actors who are acquiring Chinese weaponry and their level of dependence. Especially in India's immediate neighbourhood, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are emerging as China's key defence clients. This presages the PLA's enhanced presence in the region.
(Manoj Kewalramani is the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution. Anushka Saxena is a Research Analyst with Takshashila's Indo-Pacific Studies Programme.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
